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Legal Notices
Rule 11 in the Federal Courts
in North Carolina
By J. Rich Leonard
Since 1983, a federal practitioner
who signs a document certifies that it
is "gounded in fact and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law." Perhaps more
importantly, he or she certifies that
this belief was formed "after reason-
able inquiry." Referred to by one
North Carolina federal judge as the
"stop and think" requirement, the
new rule holds attorneys to an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness and
directs the court to impose sanctions
when this standard is violated.
Federal judges and magistrates in
North Carolina have employed Rule
11 in widely-varying factual situa-
tions. Many of those opinions are un-
published and sometimes difficult to
locate. This article discusses several
in an attempt to familiarize the bar
with this growing body of law. The
topic is particularly relevant since an
identical North Carolina Rule 11 be-
came effective January 1, 1987.
Some cases are rather straight-
forward, involving a finding by the
court that outright deception has oc-
curred. In Monroe v. Goodman, No.
86-240-CRT, (E.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 1986),
a pro se plaintiff ran afoul of Rule 11
by asserting that he had not initiated
any other lawsuit in federal court,
when in fact the precise complaint
had been filed in the Middle District
earlier and dismissed there. A similar
factual pattern led to sanctions in
Baldwin v. Boone, No. 86-83-CRT,
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 1986) and Morrison
v. Bone, No. 86-918-CRT, (E.D.N.C.
Dec. 1, 1985). The court reprimanded
the plaintiff in Baldwin, and ordered
the plaintiffs in Monroe and
Morrison to pay $200 into the Inmate
Welfare Fund, with 25 percent of
their trust fund deposits garnished
until the sum was paid. On an un-
usual set of facts, the court in Lupton
v. Thornburg, No. 85-179-CIV-4,
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 24, 1986) ordered coun-
sel for plaintiff to pay $150 to plain-
tiff and reasonable attorneys' fees of
defendants upon determining after an
evidentiary hearing that the plaintiff
had never authorized the action to be
filed.
Other cases involve the assertion of
claims without an adequate factual
basis. In Nobles v. Widner, 86-86-
CIV-4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 1987), the
court reprimanded counsel for assert-
ing a civil rights claim against both
the chief of police and a municipality
arising out of the alleged unconstitu-
tional conduct of a single police of-
ficer, when after summary judgment
motions no factual predicate could be
shown for the claim. Similarly, the
court ordered counsel for defendant to
pay plaintiff's counsel the sum of
$652.50 for the assertion of defenses
in a pre-trial order without any fac-
tual basis. Spell v. McDaniel, 84-06-
CIV-3, (E.D.N.C. May 29, 1985).
Another group of cases deals with
the requirement that there be an ade-
quate legal basis for the claim. In
Price v. Livingston, No. 86-98-CIV-5,
(E.N.D.C. May 7, 1986), counsel filed
a personal injury action in Wayne
County against a Pennsylvania native
arising out of a West Virginia acci-
dent. Upon removal, the court grant-
ed the motion to dismiss and imposed
Rule 11 sanctions, holding there was
no colorable legal theory upon which
personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant could be sustained in North Car-
olina. Counsel for plaintiff was re-
quired to pay the attorneys' fees of
counsel for defendant. In Griffin v.
Godard, No. 86-9-CIV-4, (Jan. 26,
1987), counsel for plaintiff was repri-
manded for asserting a federal cause
of action against the city of Williams-
ton for private conduct of an off-duty
police officer, while in Hasting v.
Arlen, No. C-84-931-S, (Mar. 4, 1984
M.D.N.C.), defendant's counsel was re-
quired to pay plaintiff's attorneys'
fees because of a removal from state
court without any legal basis. And in
Shreve v. Duke Power Company,
No. C-85-1372-G (M.D.N.C. May 4,
1987), the court assessed sanctions
against plaintiff's counsel for filing a
complaint outside of the applicable
limitations period.
Finally, in a lengthy opinion (the
appeal from which is pending in the
Fourth Circuit), the court repri-
manded counsel for plaintiff for filing
an action attempting to stop state
authorities from investigating a Golds-
boro attorney who had been dis-
barred. Whitted v. Jacobs, No. 86-
613-CIV-5, (E.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 1987).
The court concluded that the plaintiff
had "utterly failed to provide any
plausible legal justification for the
causes of action purportedly alleged,
and in many instances failed to ad-
vance any factual support for his alle-
gations." On the other hand, in Suitt
Construction v. Suitomo Electric Re-
search, No. C-85-530-D (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 22, 1985), the court declined to
impose sanctions when counsel argued
that the longstanding test to deter-
mine residence of a corporation under
diversity jurisdiction should be al-
tered to recognize that a corporation
Summer/1987 33
could have more than one principal
place of business. The court concluded
that even in the absence of case author-
ity, counsel should not be punished
for urging new or creative theories.
Reviewing these cases makes clear
that the holdings are very specific to
the facts of each, and that judges
have great discretion in determining
whether to employ Rule 11. Nonethe-
less, the concluding paragraph of a
recent opinion makes clear that the
pleading climate has changed:
This court will not tolerate from
any member of the bar such
abuse of judicial resources. It
matters not whether the signer
is black or white, sole practi-
tioner or senior partner in a multi-
member firm, young or old, -
male or female, small town law-
yer or corporate counsel - the
fundamental requisites for plead-
ing as well as professional ethics
establish minimum require-
ments of competency, candor
and diligence in the practice of
law.
Whitted, supra,
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Duty and the Law:
And the
By William C. Burris
Colonial Press, 1987. 244 p.
John J. Parker was for over 30
years a towering figure in the Amer-
ican judicial system. His accomplish-
ments in the improvement of the ad-
ministration of justice in the Federal
courts is unparalleled in this century.
His imprint on the development of
constitutional law through a period of
turbulent change in American polit-
ical policy (1925-1958) was profound.
His long-term impact on the Fed-
eral judiciary dwarfs the single event
for which his career is most remein-
bered - the narrow and controversial
defeat in the United States Senate (41
to 39) of his nomination to the United
States Supreme Court in 1930. In-
deed, his influence on the law might
well have been lessened by being one
of 9 justices in an oft-divided court,
rather than being the strong Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of
App! als for several decades where he
was able to impose his considerable
will on his colleagues on the bench
and the bar.
While he was Chief Judge, the
Court was rarely divided, and dis-
senting opinions were few and far be-
tween. As the author says: "He felt
that dissenting opinions usually did
more harm than good . . . he refused
to accept the view, and he was ad-
amant about this, that a judge had a
duty to cling to his own views after a
majority had determined otherwise."
In Judge Parker's words, "a judge is
taking himself much too seriously if
he feels impelled to file a dissenting
or concurring opinion every time his
own opinion does not coincide with
the majority." No doubt he had the
United States Supreme Court in mind
34
when he made that comment. One can-
not help but wonder whether if he
had actually gone to the Supreme
Court and become Chief Justice he
would by force of his personality have
been able to impose that view on his
colleagues more successfully than re-
cent Chief Justices have. If so, the
state of the law would today be much
less confused and uncertain.
Judge Parker was a North Car-
olinian through and through. Born
and reared in Monroe, of humble work-
ing-class stock on his father's side and
more prominent lineage on his
mother's side, related to several Gov-
ernors, he was from his early days
bright, ambitious and serious. He was
educated at the University of North
Carolina, both undergraduate and
law, where he was a student leader
and president of Phi Beta Kappa.
After finishing in 1908, he began prac-
ticing law briefly in Greensbor.'. then
moved to Monroe, and then ,. 1922
joined an old firm in Charlotte.
Going against family and com-
munity tradition, Parker joined the
Republican party right out of law
school, and became actively involved
in politics. He ran unsuccessfully for
Congress, for Attorney General, and
then in 1922, at the young age of 35,
for Governor. At that time, the Re-
publican party in North Carolina was
dominated by John Motley Morehead,
and the Democratic party by U.S. Sen-
ator Furnifold Simmons, head of the
famous "Simmons machine." Interest-
ingly, during that period the state
Democratic party was identified as
the white supremacy party, while the
Republican party was charged with
being the "old friend of the Negro."
Indeed, statements made by Parker in
that gubernatorial campaign to try to
defuse that issue were used against
him later in the Supreme Court nom-
ination battle by his opponents con-
tending, unfairly, that he was racist.
With the strong support of North
Carolina Democratic and Republican
leaders alike, he was appointed to the
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